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COMMITTEE REPORT

Judicial Education on
International Law Committee
of the Section of International Law
of the American Bar Association:
Final Report
PREFACE
It is with pleasure that we submit this Report of the Committee on Judicial
Education on International Law. The Committee was established because of the
Section's concern that international law issues presented to the courts are often
neither identified nor considered adequately. While the courts are well equipped
to address domestic legal issues, they are not as familiar with those of international law, even though authoritative case law is replete with affirmations that
international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
courts of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination. Since questions of international law
are being presented with increasing frequency, it was deemed important to organize a committee that would look for ways to enhance the capacity of the
courts to recognize and address them.
Former Section Chairman Charles N. Brower emphasized this background when,
in his letter inviting Chief Judge Edward D. Re to chair the Committee, he wrote:
The view has been articulated for a long time, and increasingly, within the Section

that judges in the United States as a group are not nearly as well equipped to handle the
growing number of international law questions arising in litigation as they are trained
to address the more conventional domestic law questions that are presented to them.

Indeed, concern at the bar has grown so great that the Section.

.

. has been developing
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a proposal designed to permit referral of international law questions by domestic courts
for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, special efforts
are being made by the Section to participate to the maximum extent possible in the
formulating of the revised Restatement of United States Foreign Relations Law now
being prepared by the American Law Institute, since that volume is heavily relied on by
American judges whose lack of experience in the international law field precludes them
from ready resort to broader sources of international law. In short, at a time when state,
federal and administrative courts in the United States are increasingly faced with seemingly exotic questions of international law, the affected judiciary seems inadequately
equipped, and the situation does not appear to be in the process of improving.
These considerations have led the Section . . . , of which I currently serve as Chairman, to establish a Committee on Judicial Education on International Law. The broad
purpose of the Committee is to explore the best ways in which the need discussed above
can be most promptly and economically satisfied.

In furtherance of these goals, the Committee and its several working groups
have met a total of nine times: on July 28, 1982 in Washington, D.C.; on
December 10, 1982 in New York City; on February 11, 1983 in Philadelphia;
on June 17, 1983 in New York City; on October 1, 1983 in New York City; on
February 8, 1985 in Washington, D.C.; on April 4, 1986 in New York City; on
July 25, 1986 in New York City; and on February 10, 1988 in Washington, D.C.
The Committee has been aware from the outset that its task is formidable and
that no one method of fulfilling it commends itself to the exclusion of all others.
In fact, the question of how the Committee should go about discharging its
assignment has proven to be unexpectedly unreceptive to ready consensus and,
despite continuous and thoroughly congenial vetting, no format has emerged that
is to everyone's satisfaction. The implications of this shortfall are apparent in the
form that this Report takes, a form that represents a far more modest approach
than that taken in a draft report the Committee seriously considered adopting as
recently as a year ago.
Several circumstances have conspired to force us to (borrowing Professor
Sohn's familiar felicity) elevate our sights a little lower than we have at times
thought feasible. One is our recognition that various materials already exist and
are constantly being developed that can help overcome the reluctance of judges
to address issues of international law and at the same time increase their capacity
to deal with these issues with the same degree of confidence that attends their
consideration of legal issues of a wholly domestic origin and content. Early on,
for example, we discussed the extent to which our work would or should duplicate that of the American Law Institute's then ongoing efforts to revise its
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (the product of
these efforts has now been published by the ALl and is hereinafter referred to as
"Restatement Third"). We were also aware of the several sets of general and
subject-specific bibliographic notes and commentaries that inter alia have appeared in The InternationalLawyer and other journals available to the bench and
bar, and of published research materials indicating or demonstrating techniques
and sources of legal research on specific questions of international law. We were
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aware, finally, of the many valuable course books, primers and treatises on
international law to which lawyers are able to turn both for background material
and insights into specific issues of international law. In other words, we have had
to contend with the availability of a great and constantly growing number and
variety of materials that could be seen as accomplishing or duplicating what the
Committee itself might otherwise set out to produce.
Sentiment existed, accordingly, for limiting the Committee's own work to the
production of a brief introduction to international law, complemented by a more
extensive bibliography. Many members of the Committee, however, felt or at
least genuinely hoped that our report could and should do more; specifically, that
the resources available to the Committee would enable it to fashion a new,
streamlined but still comprehensive report encompassing the most desirable features of all the above-mentioned works. After a number of discussions, this view
prevailed, and the Committee functioned primarily through the work of a principal draftsman and a drafting committee, respectively, charged with preparing
the all-purpose report ambitiously envisioned.
In the spring of 1987, a 173 page draft report of this type was submitted to the
full Committee. Several members of the Committee believed that the draft report, with a degree of editorial modification, was suitable to attain the committee
objectives. Others felt unable to endorse this assessment, however, and, while
admiring the evident generosity of labor and professional insight that marked
various sections of the draft, felt nonetheless that, in light of shortcomings or
areas upon which there was no Committee agreement, its submission to the
Section without substantial revision was premature. Those who felt this way had
also come to conclude that the resources available to the Committee were not
sufficient to produce the comprehensive report originally envisioned, especially
in light of the publication of the Restatement Third and the continuing flood of
relevant cases, statutes, treaty and customary law developments.
This assessment, which ultimately has prevailed, was influenced in part by
certain circumstances whose full significance has become clear only with the
passage of time. The pace at which issues of international law have been argued
and decided here and elsewhere in the world community, for example, has far
surpassed our expectations. The draft report put before the Committee last year
had been overtaken by such decisions even as it was being drafted and presented
to the Committee. The likelihood now of a sustained lull in decisional development, moreover, seems too meager to support the hope that an updated version
of the draft report we were then considering could remain timely long enough to
justify its presentation to the Section.
Then, too, the adoption last year and publication of the Restatement Third
casts the Committee's own Report in a different light than we, rightly or not,
originally foresaw. That is, the debates attending adoption of the Restatement
revealed differences of opinion within the ALI of far greater depth and magnitude than many anticipated. The publication of the Committee's Report, thereFALL 1990
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fore, coming, as it will, on the heels of that of the Restatement Third, runs the
risk of being construed as an endorsement or repudiation of all or parts of the
Restatement by the Section, indeed perhaps by the ABA itself, at least to the
extent that it goes over much of the same ground as the Restatement-as our
draft report did. It strikes us now as unlikely that even an earnest disclaimer on
our part would fully dispel such an implication. For obvious reasons, we are not
disposed to encourage inferences of this sort-and we doubt that the Section is,
either.
Earlier this year on February 10, 1988 a meeting of the drafting committee was
held in Washington, D.C. to discuss the nature of the Report that should be
prepared and submitted to the Section for its approval. At this meeting it was
decided to submit a report with a more modest purpose than originally contemplated. After full discussion the Chairman asked Professor Edward Gordon to
condense and recast the report so as to accomplish the more limited purpose of
providing (a) a brief primer on some questions about international law that
non-specialists are known to find especially perplexing, and (b) a bibliographic
reference to sources to which judges can turn who need greater information about
specific questions of international law. This, then, is our Report.
It represents a joint effort of the members of the Committee, all of whom
contributed generously with advice and suggestions. In particular, the Committee
wishes to acknowledge the indispensability to our work of the draft report produced, with his customary zeal and skill, by Professor Stefen A. Riesenfeld, and
to record the special debt of gratitude we owe him. Professor Riesenfeld's
contributions and vast experience played a central role in reducing the Committee's necessarily far-ranging deliberations to a focal point from which, in the
end, we were able to reach consensus.
A debt of gratitude is also owed to those Committee members who attended so
many of the meetings at their own expense, and at personal sacrifice of time and
effort. Special mention ought to be made of Committee members Professor
Margaret S. Beam, Max Chopnick, Esq., Professor Robert B. McKay, Professor Jane M. Picker and Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Esq., who, along with Professor Riesenfeld, served on the Committee's initial drafting subcommittee. A
special word of appreciation is also due Jennifer A. Sullivan, Esq., a member of
the Committee, for having greatly facilitated the work of the Committee through
her contribution as Committee Executive Secretary.
The Committee wishes to commend the Section for its initiative in establishing
the Committee, shaping its purpose and goals, and supporting its labors. The
Committee is grateful to the Section for the financial resources that the Section
has furnished. It is hoped that this Report will be deemed worthy of the support
and resources contributed by the Section and the Committee members. The
Chairman and all the members of the Committee are grateful for the opportunity
to contribute to the ongoing work of the Section in furthering the goals of the
Association in improving the administration of justice.
VOL. 24, NO. 3

COMMITTEE REPORT

907

On a personal note, the Chairman wishes to express his own thanks to former
Chairman Brower who established the Committee and to Chairmen Aksen,
Joelson, Hoyt, Rovine and Rendell, who reappointed the Committee Chairman,
and its members, and encouraged the work of the Committee.
Respectfully submitted,
/signed/
Edward D. Re, Chairman
DATED: New York, N.Y.
December 1988.
Part I
The Application of International Law in American Courts
With increasing frequency, the courts of the United States, federal and state
courts alike, are faced with a variety of issues whose resolution calls for the
application, or at least the consideration, of rules or rights derived from international law. If a matter is properly before the court, and requirements of procedure and justiciability are met, questions of international law may be raised,
argued and resolved as any other legal questions would be. It is well settled in
American jurisprudence that, as the United States Supreme Court declared in The
Paquete Habana,1
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.
The question of why international law is regarded as part of our law does not
lend itself to a single, all-purpose answer. The founding generation, influenced
by eighteenth century English court decisions as recalled by William Blackstone,
regarded international law (then known as "the law of nations") as a form of the
common law, or as resting, like the common law, upon considerations of natural
law or "right reason" or both. 2 Compliance with the law of nations was also
deemed to be a condition of national sovereignty, of membership in the family of
nations, an aspect of the decent respect for the opinions of mankind to which
Jefferson referred in the Declaration of Independence. Evidence suggests that the
Constitution itself was thought to rest upon an assumption that the law of nations
was part of the law of any civilized country. In any event, the applicability of the
1. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
2. Blackstone, in 1769, wrote:
[T]he law of nations (wherever any question arises which is properly the object of its
jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a
part of the law of the land.
W. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 67 (1st ed. 1765-1769).
FALL 1990
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law of nations in U.S. courts, both to inform the content of the Constitution,
statutes and the common law, and as an independent source of rights and obli3
gations, seems never to have been doubted by the founders of the Republic.
By the mid 19th century, the natural law underpinnings of international law
had come under attack from such scholars as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin.
Austin's impact was, and still is, especially noteworthy. Because he reasoned
that all law must emanate from the command of a sovereign, and because international law was premised upon the absence of any earthly supersovereign whose
commands could bind individual sovereign states, Austin relegated international
law to the status of mere "positive morality," rather than law strictu sensu. To
this day, some lawyers and judges influenced by the traditions of Austinian
positivism are wont to deny a full measure of respect to international law because
of the absence of a supersovereign. 4
Whatever its origins in or common heritage with natural law or the common
law, however, the status of international law as law derives principally from the
consent of sovereign states to be bound by it. The absence of a supersovereign
therefore is both theoretically and practically quite beside the point. The question
is whether the world's sovereign states have consented to the formation of a legal
norm or set of norms, or, in appropriate instances, whether such consent has been
overtaken in the course of time.
Sovereign consent can be explicit or inferred, but out of respect for sovereign
prerogatives-and sensitivities-courts do not infer such consent lightly. Consequently, in pleading an issue of international law, the principal task of the
lawyer-even beyond that of arguing the content or applicability of a norm-is
often to prove that the norm "exists" at all, that is, that both its establishment
and its current status are confirmed by the requisite degree of sovereign consent.
This task is complicated by the absence of an international legislature or other
centralized institutions capable in all cases of authenticating the existence of a
right or obligation at international law. Consequently, pleading and proof of
international law is generally more difficult than pleading and proof of norms of
a wholly domestic character.
Treaties are generally regarded as the best evidence of sovereign consent, for
many of the same reasons that commend written contracts as evidence of a
privately generated obligation. The absence of a treaty, however, does not,
without more, signify a lack of sovereign consent. Other evidence may and
routinely is adduced, such as state practice shown to evince a sense of legal
3. One of the earliest illustrations of the matter-of-fact application of the law of nations in U.S.
courts is found in Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) 11, 116 (1784), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an assault on the French consul general in Philadelphia was
"an infraction of the law of Nations. This law, in its full extent, is part of the law of the State." See
M. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 83 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn v. A. Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196, 1204-1205
(5th Cir. 1978).
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obligation to act or refrain from acting in a particular way (usually called customary law), and the resolutions and recommendations of international organizations (to the extent they manifest a sense of legal obligation or signify the
emergence of a consensus on the existence of an obligatory norm).
Customary international law, though generally more difficult to prove than
treaty law, is no less valid as a source of international legal norms. According to
the Supreme Court, the content of customary international law is determined by:
resort ...to the customs and uses of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to
the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their
authors concerning
what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the
5
law really is.
International and domestic courts have freely turned to numerous sources to
determine what the practice of states actually is.
The fact that the existence or the specific content of a particular rule is difficult
to prove does not preclude its application, however difficult it makes the task of
the party invoking it. Drawing upon dicta contained in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 6 however, some courts have
treated the degree of difficulty encountered in proving the existence of a norm as
indicative of the presence of a nonjustifiable "political question."- 7 In his dissenting opinion in that case, Justice White predicted that its effect would be to
exclude a large portion of international law from its rightful place in our law. It
has subsequently been suggested8 that this indeed has been happening.
One reason is that, in originally formulating the political question doctrine for
the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,9 Justice Brennan spoke of "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" an issue as
evincing the presence of nonjusticiable political question. Some judges have
construed or extended this to exclude from judicial consideration any issue
whose resolution turns upon a norm whose specific content is less than unambiguously clear.' 0 General principles and discreetly worded obligations of the
kind frequently encountered in international law are particulary vulnerable to this
criterion, as indeed were and are the common law and statutes drafted more
in a spirit of political compromise than in fondness for exquisite legislative

5. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
6. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). See also the references below to Baker v. Carr and Goldwater v.
Carter.
7. E.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork J.,
concurring).
8. See Gordon, American Courts, International Law and "Political Questions" Which Touch
Foreign Relations, 14 Int'l Law. 297 (1980).
9. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
10. E.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork J.,
concurring).
FALL 1990
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craftsmanship. As is frequently pointed out, the criterion seems at least anomalous given the courts' traditional ability to inform the content of such broad
principles as due process, equal protection and free speech.
The anomaly was probably compounded when, in redefining this element of a
political question in Goldwater v. Carter," Justice Powell said the relevant
question is whether resolution of an issue "demand[s] that a court move beyond
areas of judicial expertise." As already noted, judges in the United States as a
group are not nearly as well trained in or familiar with questions of international
law as they are with more conventional domestic law questions. The unintended
effect of Justice Powell's reformulation, accordingly, may be to elevate this
unfortunate failing in judicial training to the level of a criterion for declining to
consider an issue.
Although the political question doctrine has come under withering attack from
scholars, as well as from some judges, 12 it continues to display some vitality and
to be invoked by lower courts in the context of foreign affairs. Even without
doctrinal structure, U.S. courts have traditionally shown a reluctance to make
determinations that might be seriously detrimental to the United States in its
foreign relations. As Justice Brennan himself was careful to point out in Baker
v. Carr, however, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."' 13 To this we are
inclined to add that it is also error to suppose that every issue that turns upon the
application of international law is thereby disruptive of U.S. foreign relations.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution' 4 establishes an independent authority in United States law for the application of international agreements to
which the United States itself is a party. It provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Since the early nineteenth century, American courts have amplified this provision
by distinguishing between so-called self-executing treaties and non-self-executing
ones. The distinction has its origin in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 15 in which Chief
Justice John Marshall, speaking of a treaty's domestic law effect, wrote:
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does
not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its
operation is infra-territorial; but is carried to execution by the sovereign power of the
respective parties to the instrument.
11.444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979).
12. See, e.g.,
Henkin, IsThere a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597 (1976); and
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, supra, at 808 (Bork J., concurring).
13. 369 U.S. at 710.
14. Article VI, section 2.
15. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-314 (1829).
VOL. 24, NO. 3
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In the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
Later, in the Head Money cases, 6 the Court said:
A treaty ...is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.
And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute.
In American law, accordingly, treaties to which the United States is a party are
deemed to apply in any case or controversy without further legislative endorsement or other intervention, and with the same force as legislation, as long as their
provisions are construed as having been aimed directly at the courts, rather than
at the political branches. Applying this seemingly straightforward doctrine has
not always been easy, however; 17 in fact, not long ago the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit observed that "the 8 self-executing question is perhaps one of the
most confounding in treaty law."'
Whether a treaty, or a particular provision in it, is self-executing is ordinarily
a matter of domestic law. 19 That is, in the first instance, it is a question for the
Executive Branch, which must decide whether to "take care" that the treaty is "faithfully executed" as law 2° or to seek implementation by Congress. Ultimately, though,
the courts themselves may have to decide whether to give the treaty effect as law, if
there has been no legislative or administrative implementation.
In doing so, courts have generally considered the question to be one of documentary interpretation, and in aid of a proper interpretation have indicated a

16. 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
17. See 14 Whiteman, Digest of Intemational Law 304 (1970). The literature on this subject is
vast, for example, Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical
Analysis, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 627 (1986); Feo, Self-Execution of United Nations Security Resolutions:
United States Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 387 (1976); Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 892 (1980); Riesenfeld, The
Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and Community Law: A Pioneer Decision of the Court of Justice
of the European Community, 67 Am. J. Int'l L. 504 (1973); Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of SelfExecuting Treaties and GATT: A Notable German Judgment, 65 Am. J.Int'l L. 548 (1971); Jackson,
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 250
(1967).
A more complete list is provided by Professor John H. Jackson of the University of Michigan Law
School in a chapter on United States practice prepared for F. Jacobs and S. Roberts eds., The Effect
of Treaties in Domestic Law (1987), at 148 ff.
18. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
19. See Aerovias Interamericanos de Panama v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230,
245 (S.D. Fla. 1961), and Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 158 (1972). But see Iwasawa, supra note 16, at 650.
20. U.S. Const., Art. II, sec. 3.
FALL 1990
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willingness to give the Executive Branch's construction of the negotiators' intentions considerable weight. 2' However, treaty negotiators do not always have
the U.S. domestic law consequences firmly in mind when drafting these agreements, particularly multilateral ones; hence the task of interpretation may require
the drawing of inferences from the text of the agreement itself, the context in
which it was adopted, the effect given to similar or analogous treaties or treaty
provisions, etc. 22 As a result, the construction given by the Executive Branch
may weigh less heavily upon the court in some cases than in others. 23 For
analogous reasons, while courts may look to congressional intent (i.e., as expressed in the course of authorizing or consenting to international agreements) to
determine whether an agreement was intended to be self-executing, 24 they do not
do so invariably.
It has been suggested that certain types of treaty obligations can never be
self-executing, e.g., because the Constitution reserves certain powers, such as
the power to appropriate funds, to Congress, 25 or because Constitutional requirements prevent any treaty definition of a crime from being self-executing as a
criminal statute. 26
The Constitution mentions only one type of international agreement, termed a
"treaty,'27 and provides for only one method of approval, i.e., the "advice and
consent" by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Virtually from the outset, however,
U.S. practice has developed alternative types of international agreements, called
21. In Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985), for example, the Seventh Circuit
considered President Ford's statement at the time of signing the Helsinki Accords ("...
the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any particular state.
) as relevant
to the question of the direct applicability of the Accords. Similarly, in Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d
909, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the D.C. Circuit considered the report of the U.S. delegate in determining
the self-executing nature of the treaty in question. Cf. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
22. In Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit said that in
determining whether a treaty was intended to be self-executing it would look to six factors: (1)the
language and purpose of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its execution;
(3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of
alternate enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and
(6) the capacity of the judiciary to resolve the dispute. See also People of Saipan v. United States
Department of the Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
832 (1979), and even more emphatically Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
24. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. 1986); Bertrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982).
25. See Jackson "United States Practice," inF. Jacobs and S. Roberts eds., The Effect of
Treaties inDomestic Law (1987), at150, citing
Turner v.American Baptist Missionary Union, 24
F. Cas. 344 (No.14251) (C.C.Mich., 1852).
26. See The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D.Conn. 1925).
27. The Constitution refers
to"treaties"
infour places: (i) inArticle I,section 10, clause (1),
depriving the states
of the treaty-making power; (ii)
in Article II,section 2, clause (2), which
provides for Presidential negotiation of treaties,
then advice and consent of the Senate, and finally
ratification
by the President; (iii)
inArticle III,
section 2,clause (1),
which stipulates
that
the judicial
power shall
extend toallcases arising under treaties
made by the United States;
and (iv)
in the
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, section 2, supra.
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"executive agreements," that do not require such consent. That is, the President
sometimes engages the United States in internationally binding agreements on
the basis solely of his foreign relations authority; on the basis of consent expressed or implicit in an earlier treaty; on the basis of prior or subsequent
approval by a majority of both houses of Congress; or some combination of these
methods and instrumentalities of authority. 28 The choice of one technique or
another is usually based upon political considerations, although the President
will generally adhere to the customs and usages concerning form which have
evolved in U.S. practice. 29
The implications of the use of one or another type of executive agreement have
not been fully explored by the courts. Still unsettled, for example, is whether,
like a Senate consented-to "treaty," an executive agreement can prevail against
an earlier act of Congress 30 or, for that matter, a prior inconsistent "treaty."
Treaties to which only two or a few states are parties seldom create generally
applicable rules of international law. As Marshall's dictum in Foster & Elam v.
Neilson indicates, they are ordinarily in the nature of contracts, in which event
they prescribe obligations as between the contracting parties only. International
law takes cognizance of, and generally enforces, these self-prescribed obligations by virtue of the operation of the ancient and, presumably, universal principle known to international law as pacta sunt servanda, which requires agreements to be carried out in good faith. As self-evident as it may appear, therefore,
it is nonetheless worth noting that recognition of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda itself may be thought of as establishing an independent authority for the
application in our courts of treaties (without, of course, assuring that any particular agreement will be deemed self-executing).
A difficult question is whether, when treaties create international organs and
empower them to establish or confirm the existence of rules of international law,
the rules validly established or vindicated by these organs also become part of
international law to which our courts should give cognizance. In practice, few
such organs have been created, and those, like the UN General Assembly and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which appear to have authority similar to
that of domestic law-creating or law-validating organs in fact usually have far
less. The General Assembly, for example, is empowered to make recommendations, to interpret the UN Charter, to set the budget and other priorities of the
28. The Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), suggests
that, under certain circumstances, Congress' mere acquiescence in the making of an executive
agreement may constitute sufficient authorization.
29. See U.S. Department of State, Digest of the United States Practice in International Law,
1975, at 321. These tendencies are the subject of a vast ocean of legal scholarship, most recently
summarized in Jackson, supra note 22, at 142 ff.
30. Compare Restatement of the Law (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965), note 10, § 144(1)(b), with the draft Restatement Revised, § 135, comment c, Reporters' Note
5. See Lesser, Superseding Statutory Law by Sole Executive Agreement: An Analysis of the American Law Institute's Shift in Position, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 692-94 (1983).
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United Nations Organization, and to adopt or propose resolutions or codes of
behavior. It has not been accorded legislative powers, however, and its recommendations and other actions therefore traditionally have been regarded as no
more than evidence of the acknowledgment by the members of the world community of the existence of a particular norm or set of norms. The evidentiary
value of actions taken by the General Assembly is far from conclusive, however,
especially if, as is often the case, it appears that in taking such action states are
acting for reasons of political expediency rather than out of a sense of legal
obligation.
Similarly, while the judgments and advisory options of the ICJ are certainly
entitled to the measure of respect appropriate to high courts of distinction, the
instruments establishing the ICJ 3 1 do not empower it to create binding obligations, other than as against the states parties to cases in which the rulings are
issued (and even within the instruments there is no analogous doctrine of precedent). The weight accorded by other states to rulings of the Court is thus not
a matter of a second stage operation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, nor
of an acceptance of the ICJ's judgments as binding precedent. It is rather a matter
of the respect generally shown by courts for the informed judgment of a kindred
judicial body that, with good reason, has generally been regarded as expert in
questions of (in this instance) international law.
It is worth recalling, finally, that international legal norms may find their way
into United States law indirectly, for instance, when incorporated by reference in
statutes 32 or by private parties in their dealings inter se, or when used by courts
to inform the content of otherwise ambiguous Constitutional or statutory provisions. The latter deserves special mention, because it is a little-noted but significant contribution that international law makes to domestic law in many countries
today. That is, since courts presume that statutes are to be construed in accor33
dance with international law unless an unavoidably contrary intention appears,
international legal norms and standards may be helpful in informing the specific
content of Constitutional or statutory provisions, or in applying such provisions
to particular factual contexts. 34 In this way, international legal norms influence
adjudication in domestic courts even without formal adoption or recognition.
As a final note, we observe that the applicability of international legal norms
in specific cases may be, and frequently is, limited by the considerations of
jurisdiction, equity and due process that bear upon all proceedings before U.S.
courts. A decent respect for the opinions of mankind, however, as well as for our
31. I.e., the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
32. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
33, Like the presumption that international law is part of the land, this presumption is of vintage
origin. See, e.g., The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64 (1804).
34. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides an apt illustration. See generally Christenson, Using
Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 3
(1983).
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own judicial traditions, demands that such considerations not be invoked merely
to disguise an unwillingness to accord international legal norms their rightful
place in our legal system.
Part II
Research in International Law
Researching questions of international law often confronts judges with a formidable, time-consuming and frustrating task for which even the most rigorous
training in researching conventional domestic law questions may provide scant
preparation. Bibliographies do exist, but are seldom cited in pleadings. Two
recent publications have come to our attention that seem likely to ease this
problem:
(1) a 126-page bibliography compiled by Simone-Marie Kleckner, Law Librarian of the United States Court of International Trade, entitled International
Legal Bibliography (2d ed.), published by Oceana Publications, Inc., in 1988;
(2) John W. Williams' Guide to InternationalLegal Research, a special issue
(actually two issues combined) of volume 20 of The George WashingtonJournal
of InternationalLaw and Economics (1986), pp. 1-413.
We would also note the publication of the bound edition of Restatement
Third 35 which, unlike the above mentioned research aids, is designed in major
part to provide guidance to substantive areas of international law, as well as to
questions affecting its application in United States courts. It is important to bear
in mind, however, that despite the absence of an international legislature or
similar centralized law-making institution, international law is a dynamic process, its norms constantly changing, as do all legal norms, in response to the felt
needs of the community. The Restatement Third, like the Restatement Second
(there was no Restatement of United States Foreign Relations Law prior to the
Second) or any other Restatement, can provide only a starting point for research
into contemporary questions of international law. Moreover, the Restatement
does not purport to be, and cannot substitute for, a comprehensive treatise on
questions of international law, nor should it be expected to obviate the use of
primary source materials.
We note, too, that international law is now characterized by a far greater
degree of specialization than was the case even a decade or so ago. For this
reason, specialized law journals and reporting services have proliferated and new
ones appear with disarming frequency. It is a commonplace observation that this
increase in the quantity of materials available to persons researching questions of
international law has not yet assured a uniform increase in quality. Judgmental
discretion is therefore advised.
35. American Law Institute: Restatement of the Law, Third: Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, St. Paul, Minn., 1987. 2 V. (adopted and promulgated May 14, 1986).
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